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VALIDITY OF STATE STATUTE BASING TAx ON AUTHORIZED
CAPITAL STOCK OF A FOREIGN CORPORATION
From the rule of Bank of 4ugusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519, 1o L. Ed.
274 (1839), that a foreign corporation has no absolute right of recog-
nition beyond the jurisdiction of its creator, existing in other states only
by their consent, Mr. Justice Field, in the celebrated decision of Paul v.
Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 181, 19 L. Ed. 357 (1869), deduced, "as a
matter of course, that such assent may be granted upon such terms and
conditions as those States may think proper to impose. They may ex-
clude the corporation entirely; they may restrict its business to particular
localities; or they may exact such security for the performance of its
contracts with their citizens as in their judgment will best promote the
public interest." On the meagre concept of comity, corporations were
able to continue in the conduct of local business, but this did not impair
or deny the state's arbitrary power. Runyan v. Coster, 14 Pet. 122, 10
L. Ed. 382 (1840); Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648, 15 Sup. Ct.
207 (1895); He~hill v. Orloff, 277 U.S. 537, 548, 48 Sup. Ct.
577, 579, 72 L. Ed. 978 (1928); Doyle v. Continental Insur. Co.,
94 U. S. 535, 24 L. Ed. 148 (1876); Security Mutual Life Ins. Co.,
v. Prewitt, 202 U. S. 246, 26 Sup. Ct. 619, 5o L. Ed. 1013 (i9O6).
Such a restrictive judicial attitude reflected, however, what was at that
time "the social resultant of the local jealousies and provincial interests
of the more agrarian communities, and the budding nationalism of com-
merce and finance." See Henderson, "The Position of Foreign Cor-
porations in American Constitutional Law," pages 163-164 (1918).
But the dynamic economic changes that followed x869, making
nationwide enterprise the rule rather than the exception, had by i9IO
persuaded a majority of the United States Supreme Court that the
doctrine of Paul v. Virginia was no longer socially or economically jus-
tifiable. W.B.R., The ldoption of the Liberal Theory of Foreign
Corporations, 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 956, 962 (1930-1931); Hender-
son, supra, 163-i64; Thomas Reed Powell, "Indirect Encroachment
of Federal Authority," 31 Har. L. Rev. 572, 584-618 (1917-I918).
The reversal in attitude is revealed in Western Union Telegraph Co. v.
Kansas, 216 U. S. I, 3o Sup. Ct. 190, 54 L. Ed. 355 (I9IO), holding
invalid a Kansas statute requiring of every foreign corporation as a
condition of its right to continue in or to commence local business the
payment of an entrance fee based upon and graduated according to total
authorized capital stock. Mr. Justice Harlan, delivering the opinion of
the Court, ascribed invalidity to two features of the act: (I) it taxed
property of the Company located outside of the state in violation of the
due process clause; and (2) the intrastate and interstate business of the
Company being economically inseparable, the tax on the capital stock,
which represented the property and business, constituted an unreasonable
burdening of interstate commerce. The Justice recognized the force of
Paul v. Virginia but distinguished it on the fact that the corporation
there involved was an ordinary business concern not engaged in inter-
state commerce. Western Union case, supra, p. 33; Thomas Reed
Powell, supra, p. 6o9.
Mr. Justice White, concurring with the majority, rested his view
upon a doctrine of estoppel grounded in due process. Kansas had by
tacit consent permitted Western Union to do intrastate business there
along with its interstate activities, as a result of which the two phases
had become inextricably interconnected. Consequently, reasoned the Jus-
tice, the alternative of eviction or submission to the fee amounted to con-
fiscation of corporate property, although clearly no such conclusion would
follow where the corporation had never entered the state to do intra-
state business. Paul v. Virginia, however, was not without its cham-
pions. Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting for himself and tvo brethren,
confessed his "inability to understand how a condition can be unconsti-
tutional when attached to a matter over which a State has absolute,
arbitrary power." Western Union case, supra, p. 54. He neatly cuts the
heart out of Justice White's estoppel theory by citing many cases to the
effect that generally a corporation already in the state is infected with
the original weakneess of dependence on the will of the state. Western
Union case, supra, p. 54. But in 1912, these champions of the doctrine
of restrictive state power conceded the victory to the rule of the Western
Union case as applied to corporations engaged in public utility activities.
Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. O'Connor, 223 U. S. 280, 32 Sup. Ct.
216 (1912).
The corrosion of the restrictive theory of Paul v. Virginia was tem-
porarily halted at this point when in 1913 a divided Supreme Court in
Baltic Mining Co. v. Massachusetts, 231 U. S. 68, 34 Sup. Ct. i5, 58
L. Ed. 127 (1913), sustained a Massachusetts statute imposing on every
foreign corporation an annual excise tax to be assessed on one-fiftieth of
one per cent of the par value of its authorized capital stock; but the
amount of such tax in no case to exceed $2000. The two corporations
involved in the case operated ordinary non-utility businesses; there did
not exist, therefore, that almost complete economic fusion of interstate
and intrastate business peculiar to the utility. Sustaining the measure of
the tax, the Court held that: (i) the tax was an excise upon the privilege
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of carrying on business within the state and not a tax on the extraterri-
torial property of the corporations violative of due process; and (2) the
$2000 maximum limit of taxation constituted a reasonable charge for
the privilege granted with no unreasonable burden resulting to interstate
commerce.
After this lull in the onrush of the new doctrine, the judicial axe again
fell in Looney v. Crane Co., 245 U. S. 178, 38 Sup. Ct. 85, 62 L. Ed.
230 (917), this time terminating the life of a statute requiring pay-
ments by foreign corporations of a permit and a franchise tax, both with-
out maximum limits. The fact that the complaining taxpayer was not
of the public utility class did not save the statute; the rule of the Western
Union case was extended to manufacturing and commercial corpora-
tions, at least in the absence of a safeguarding maximum limitation. This
qualification loomed for a time as quite significant; indeed, the cases
appeared to teach that validity turned on the presence of a maximum
provision. Thus it was this distinction between the statutes in the two
cases which the Court had in mind in distinguishing the Baltic Mining
decision on the ground that the peculiar provisions of the Massachusetts
statute were compatible with the Constitution. Looney case, supra, at
p. 19o. On the other hand, omission several years later of maximum
provisions in this same Massachusetts statute resulted in a holding of
invalidity in International Paper Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U.S. 135,
38 Sup. Ct. 292, 62 L. Ed. 624 (1918). In accord, Alpha Portland
Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203, 45 Sup. Ct. 477, 69 L.
Ed. 916 (1925) ; Locomobile Corp. of America v. Massachusetts, 246
U.S. 146, 38 Sup. Ct. 298, 62 L. Ed. 631 (1918). See Colbert and
Pyke, Taxation of Foreign Corporations, 5 Cin. L. Rev. 54 1931-
Further proof seemed to lie in the favorable treatment twice accorded
the Virginia statute (Tax Code Va. Sec. 207, Code 1936, p. 2463)
which exacted a fee for local business based on total authorized capital
stock, but with maximum limits. In General Railway Signal Corp. v.
Virginia, 246 U.S. 500, 38 Sup. Ct. 36o, 62 L. Ed. 854 (I918), the
Court emphasized the presence of maximum limits, though emphasis was
likewise placed upon the fact that for each bracket there was laid a flat
fee not varying in direct proportion to the measure utilized. In W'Vestern
Union Gas Construction Co. v. Virginia, 276 U.S. 597, 48 Sup. Ct.
319, 72 L. Ed. 723 (1928), the Court was content to sustain the
statute in a per curiam opinion.
Despite these indications, the era of the maximum limitation as a
validating provision came to an abrupt end shortly thereafter in Cudahy
Packing Co. v. Hinkle, 278 U.S. 460, 49 Sup. Ct. 204, 73 L. Ed. 454
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(1929). Though the maximum was but $3000 the Court would have
none of it. This immunization gone, utility and non-utility foreign
corporations were alike within the protective mantle of the Western
Union rule. The unqualified triumph of the new doctrine is brought
home in the Court's outright repudiation of the Baltic Mining case. Not
without great significance is the fact that the doctrine of Paul v. Virginia
found in the Cudahy case another great champion in Mr. Justice
Brandeis. In dissenting in the Cudahy case, supra, pages 467-68, he
declared: "The taxes are not measured by the amount of interstate
commerce. They do not grow, or shrink, according to the volume of
interstate commerce or of the capital used in it. They are not furtively
directed against such commerce. The taxes would be precisely the same
in amount if the corporation did in Washington no interstate business
whatsoever. Nor are the taxes laid upon property without the State.
Indeed, they are neither property taxes nor substitutes for property taxes.
They are an excise, laid solely for the privilege of doing business as a
corporation."
The sympathetic attitude which Mr. Justice Brandeis there mani-
fested toward the doctrine of Paul v. Virginia again reveals itself in the
very recent case of Atlantic Refining Co. v. Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia, 301 U.S.-, 58 Sup. Ct. 75, 82 L. Ed. 52 (1937). Speaking
here for a unanimous Court, the Justice sustained the validity of the
Virginia statute which had twice successfully met the constitutional
hurdle in the period before the Cudahy decision. General Railway Signal
Corp. v. Virginia, supra; Western Union Gas Construction Co. v. Vir-
ginia, supra. The Atlantic Refining Co., seeking entrance into Virginia
for the first time, objected to paying the maximum fee of $5ooo on its
authorized capital stock of over $9o,ooo,ooo. A decision favorable to
the statute required explanation in the face of its close similarity to the
statute stricken down in the Cudahy case. In satisfaction of the principle
of stare decisis, Mr. Justice Brandeis fell back upon a distinction between
corporation in and corporation out. In each of the earlier cases, "the
corporation had, before the exaction held unconstitutional, entered the
State with its permission to do local business and pursuant to that permis-
sion had acquired property and made other expenditures"; here, nothing
like this had occurred to estop the state. Atlantic Refining case, supra,
p. So. Such a distinction can be rationalized into a tenable position both
on strict constitutional grounds and on considerations of broad social
policy. After a foreign corporation has with the tacit consent of the
state entered into the doing of intrastate business there, the alternative
of eviction or submission does smack of unwarranted interference with
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the property interests protected by due process. See Note (1938) 51
Harv. L. Rev. 5o8. Viewed more broadly, the distinction can be
thought of as an effective device by which to prevent the extension of
judicial protection of the foreign corporation to the newer forms of
large scale corporate activity. Such a purpose would seem to be at one
with Mr. Justice Brandeis' general concern over increasing corporate
power as reflected in his celebrated dissent in Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288
U.S. 517, 53 Sup. Ct. 481, 77 L. Ed. 929, 85 A.L.R. 699 (1933).
On the other hand, the distinction of corporation in and corporation
out can scarcely establish for itself respectable legal parentage. It cannot
claim to be the off-spring of the doctrine inaugurated in Western Union
Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, supra, and extended in the Looney and
Cudahy cases, supra, for in the considerations which dictated this reversal
in judicial attitude there is no room for any such distinction. That it
cannot claim Paul v. Virginia, Mr. Justice Holmes pointed out in I9io
when Mr. Justice White first suggested the concept in his concurring
opinion in the Western Union case, supra. Indeed, Mr. Justice Brandeis
seems aware of this, for he denies the inherent validity of the distinction
even before he gives it life. In an early paragraph of his opinion he
declares, "It may be assumed that the rule declared in Terral v. Burke
Construction Co., 257 U.S. 529, 42 Sup. Ct. I88, 66 L. Ed. 352, 21
A.L.R. 186 (1922) [extending the doctrine of unconstitutional condi-
tions to state denial of suit in the federal courts by foreign corporations]
is applicable also to conditions to be performed wholly before admission;
and that the $5ooo must be refunded if its exaction involved denial of
any constitutional right. For we are of opinion that in refusing to grant
the authority to carry on local business except upon payment of the
$5ooo no constitutional right of the company was violated." dtlantic
Refining case, supra, p. 77. Herein lies the fundamental significance of
the Court's latest pronouncement, the more significant because the
Justice carried the entire Court with him. The distinction between
corporation in and corporation out is drawn only in deference to stare
decisis; the real purport of the case is that, whether demanded of a
corporation in or of one out an exaction measured by total authorized
capital stock normally involves violation of neither due process nor the
commerce clause.
Taking its cue from majority views expressed in the Western Union,
Looney and Cudahy cases, the Refining Company had confidently urged
that a statute which measures the charges solely by total authorized
capital stock deprives the foreign corporation of due process because the
exaction involves the taxation of property beyond the jurisdiction. To
this the Justice answered that the exaction is not a tax upon corporate
property but a fee demanded for a privilege granted and arbitrariness
cannot be found in a statutory scheme to measure the value of such a
privilege by the corporation's total potential economic power as reflected
in the amount of its authorized capital stock. Buttressed by the Court's
significant action in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Grosjean,
301 U.S. 412, 57 Sup. Ct. 772, 81 L. Ed. 1193, 112 A.L.R. 293
(937), permitting a state to measure its chain store tax upon a chain's
total number of units wherever located, Mr. Justice Brandeis clearly
leads the Court to an espousal of the view of the supposedly repudiated
Baltic Mining opinion and of his own dissent in Cudahy Packing Co. v.
Hinkle, supra. By the same token he at a stroke cuts from beneath the
Vestern Union decision and its offshoots a significant part of the legal
foundation upon which they were rested.
As with the due process point so with interstate commerce, the
Refining Co. had built its argument upon the decisions which had
seemed to set at rest the question of state power to base a tax upon a
foreign corporation's total authorized capital stock. In answer, Mr.
Justice Brandeis employs practically verbatim his dissenting argument
in the Cudahy case. At p. 78 in the tlantic Refining opinion he says:
"The entrance fee is obviously not a charge furtively directed against
interstate commerce; nor a charge laid upon interstate commerce; nor
a charge measured by such commerce. Its amount does not grow or
shrink according to the volume of interstate commerce or the amount
of the capital used in it. The size of the fee would be exactly the same
if the company did no interstate commerce in Virginia or elsewhere.
The entrance fee is comparable to the charter, or incorporation, fee of
a domestic corporation of a fee commonly measured by the amount of
the capital authorized." Gone is the reasoning which supported Looney
v. Crane Co. and Cudahy Packing Co. v. Hinkle, supra; in its place
emerges the view, buttressed by reliance upon the judicial attitude which
has always been exhibited toward the domestic corporation, that in iact
such a tax imposes no real burden on interstate commerce. Only where
interstate and intrastate business are demonstrably interwoven as in the
public utility is there any suggestion that the conclusion might be other-
wise. The decision in Atlantic Refining Co. v. Virginia, supra, thus
appears to be primarily significant for the basis which it lays for a later
repudiation of the restrictions on state power fashioned after 191 o, if not
of the Western Union decision itself.
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